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This study aims to explore the permissibility of guarantee for muḍārabah and mushārakah based 
contracts and to discuss in detail the essence of muḍārabah and mushārakah, which both contracts 
contain the concepts of trust and profit sharing. The study conducted the qualitative research 
approaches which consist of documents analysis, interviews and observations in few phases.  The 
study found that there are few matters that can be listed as genuine essence of muḍārabah and 
mushārakah. It also found that the majority of scholars were of the view of prohibiting capital 
guarantee by partners. It also proved that few statements such as Ibn Taymiyah’s statement were 
quoted out of context and definitely not appropriate to attribute the stance of those who allowed capital 
guarantee to him by using his statements, as those statements showed something else. However, a 
third party may undertake to bear the loss of capital due to misconduct or negligence on the part of 
the manager for both contracts. The rabb al-māl (capital provider) may also take collateral from the 
muḍārib, provided that the collateral can only be liquidated in the event of negligence or misconduct 
or violation of contractual terms by the muḍārib. 
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Introduction
In the wake of the vast development of Islamic 
finance over the last few decades, much has 
been said about the limited track record of 
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) applying risk 
sharing principles, especially muḍārabah and 
mushārakah. The issues of high risk in general 
and multi-faceted business risks in particular that 
are associated with muḍārabah and mushārakah 
remain obstacles to their implementation. To 
minimize those risks scholars have suggested 
a few steps such as proper guidelines on taqṣīr 
(negligence) and taʽaddī (transgression). 
Discussion of the concepts of taqṣīr, taʽaddī, 
guarantee and the management of moral hazard 
in muḍārabah and mushārakah products is 
paramount in realizing their implementation.
Problem Statement
One major problem with the profit and loss 
sharing (PLS) contracts that has been frequently 
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mentioned in the literature is the agency problem, 
which is said to be inherent to these types of 
contracts. For example, in the words of the State 
Bank of Pakistan 2008, “The agency problem is 
one of the major factors for the reluctance on the 
part of banks to undertake equity based modes of 
financing, as it gives entrepreneurs the incentive 
to underʽstate profits.” [Kazarian E.G, 1993; 
Rickwood and Murinde in Iqbal M. & Llewellyn 
D. T. (eds.), 2002; Dār H. A. & Presley J. R., 
2000; Iqbal M. &Molyneux P., 2005].
Ashraf and Lokmanul Hakim [2011], after 
noting the moral hazard of customers reporting 
loses in their financial statements in order to 
avoid paying the rabb al-māl, suggested that IFIs 
in muḍārabah and mushārakah arrangements 
may require customers to prove their integrity in 
order to protect the IFIs’ position. Part of the due 
diligence process when applying for muḍārabah 
financing involves feasibility studies. Financing 
will not be approved unless the proposed project 
is determined to have a good probability of being 
profitable. The occurrence of loss raises the very 
real possibility that the customer was negligent. 
Hence, such customers have a responsibility to 
prove that they are not guilty. 
However, this view seems to contradict the 
stance of Sharīʽah from a few aspects. First, 
the Islamic legal maxim states: al-aṣl barā’at 
al-dhimmah (freedom from liability is the 
pre-existing and therefore prevailing state). 
Second, muḍārabah is a trust-based contract; 
the entrepreneur holds the capital provider’s 
fund under the principle of trust. Requiring 
the entrepreneur to prove his innocence means 
that he is presumed guilty unless he provides 
evidence to the contrary, which may contradict 
the essence of the muḍārabah contract.
All of this highlights the need to analyse the 
issues in detail in to uphold the appropriate 
view related to the essence of both contracts 
and the limitation that a guarantee can be 
implemented in partnership contracts. There 
is a need for a concrete view of the essence 
of muḍārabah and mushārakah in order 
to avoid any possibility of transforming 
them into a contract of ḍamān (guarantee).
Objectives
The objectives of this study are to explore the 
permissibility of guarantee for muḍārabah and 
mushārakah based contracts and to discuss 
in detail the essence of muḍārabah and 
mushārakah, which both contain the concepts of 
trust and profit sharing.
 
Literature Review
This section discussed about the previous study 
done by other researches related to the contract 
of muḍārabah and mushārakah. Besides, this 
reviews also touched about the problem of capital 
and Muqtaḍā al-ʽAqd in the both contracts. 
Thus, based on literature analysis, there are 
some of issues arises related to the contracts that 
has been listed at the end of the section.
Hassan and Mehmat [2008] said that muḍārabah 
contains many risks, particularly business risks. 
They insisted that managing a business has its 
own risks and that Islamic banks need to face 
these risks. Among other risks inherent to 
muḍārabah are the business partner’s freedom 
to terminate the partnership at any time, which 
will definitely cause the business to be liquidated 
because no one can be forced to continue a 
partnership against his/her will. Given this 
reality, many Islamic banks avoid unnecessary 
exposure to muḍārabah risk. 
However, a few studies revealed that some 
anxieties, such as the withdrawal of investors, 
have been overcome through the existing 
structure of the muḍārabah contract, based on 
the decisions of the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Finance Institutions 
(AAOIFI) as stated in Sharīʽah Standard 2010, 
Standard 13, Section 4, which affirms that the 
muḍārabah contract is not binding (ghayr 
lāzim) and that each contracting party is free to 
withdraw except in two situations:
1. The muḍārib has started the work; as 
soon as that happens the muḍārabah 
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becomes binding until the occurrence of 
liquidation (tanḍīḍ), either actual (ḥaqīqī) 
or constructive (ḥukmī).
2. If the two sides have agreed to stipulate 
a term for the muḍārabah, it cannot be 
dissolved before the due date except with 
the consent of both parties.
If an Islamic bank enters into a partnership 
in which the managing partner cannot be 
held responsible for any operational losses, it 
means the Islamic bank cannot collateralize 
the risk. Therefore the muḍārabah structure of 
equity finance becomes riskier for the Islamic 
banks. In fact, it is listed as the fifth risky type 
of financing in terms of credit risk (Khan and 
Ahmed, 2001). Moreover, Islamic banks as 
financial intermediaries have to undertake the 
process of project evaluation, which is very long 
and costly. The expertise that is needed for the 
decision process is complicated. Several authors 
have come up with a number of solutions in 
order to make PLS contracts more appealing to 
IFIs. Bacha (1997) proposed that the muḍārib 
must ‘reimburse’ the rabb al-māl in the event of 
certain outcomes. Karim (2000) recommended 
that the muḍārib contribute some capital or 
collateral in the project. Adnan & Muḥammad 
(in Obaidullah, 2008) argued that while cases of 
muḍārib negligence leading to losses are taken 
care of in muḍārabah, proper systems should 
evolve to establish such negligence and ascribe 
the losses to the muḍārib. Khan (2003) suggested 
that banks guarantee investment deposits by 
tabarruʽ to minimize the agency problem.
A few papers were presented on this topic at 
the Fifth Regional Sharīʽah Scholars Dialogue 
in Phuket, Thailand in 2011. Ashraf and 
Lokmanul Hakim (2011) emphasized that the 
view of the majority of scholars prohibiting 
a guarantee in muḍārabah is the strongest 
opinion. However, they said that stipulating a 
guarantee in muḍārabah using the same basis as 
in the imposition of liability on artisans and on 
those offering their labor to the general public 
(taḍmīn al-ṣunnāʽ and al-ajīr al-mushtarak) 
seems acceptable in order to protect public 
interest (maṣlaḥah ʽāmmah) against the loss of 
wealth, especially in a time when dishonesty has 
become typical behavior.
Reflecting on the view above, this study 
observes that the guarantee element in both 
issues, i.e., taḍmīn al-ṣunnāʽ and al-ajīr al-
mushtarak, does not change the nature of either 
contract. Each is inclined to be categorized as 
ḍamān al-yad (liability due to possession) or 
ḍamān al-mutlafāt (indemnity for damage). 
Therefore, the guarantee should be allowed 
in both cases as no element of qarḍ and ribā 
appears in them. However, the case is different 
in a muḍārabah contract, as the arrangement in 
muḍārabah is providing money against a portion 
of the profit. Therefore, any guarantee element 
shall transform the contract into a qarḍ contract. 
Hence, the guarantee element has changed 
the essential nature of muḍārabah (muqtaḍā 
al-ʽaqd). Therefore, any measures to protect 
the investors (rabb al-māl) should observe 
these matters. Steps in that direction are still 
possible as long as the efforts do not exceed the 
boundaries of muḍārabah’s essential nature. 
Ashraf and Hakim (2011: 16-17) then suggested 
that muḍārabah contracts with small and 
medium industries should be treated on the basis 
that they are liable for the capital in the event 
of loss unless they are able to prove that they 
were free from any negligence or irregularities 
in the management of the capital. The authors 
then gave the justifications for this view and 
suggested maintaining the original rules of 
muḍārabah for strong companies.
This research is of the view that the nature 
(muqtaḍā) of muḍārabah has been changed 
to ḍamān when the losses are placed directly 
on the entrepreneur. Whenever the nature of 
muḍārabah has been shifted to a guarantee-
based contract, the rabb al-māl is permitted to 
take collateral against any loss. In addition, the 
nature of muḍārabah becomes similar to qarḍ. 
Furthermore, the entrepreneurs then have to fight 
to prove their innocence. Another issue that may 
arise is to whom they have to prove it. This needs 
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to be proven in court, which consumes a lot of 
time and money. Assigning the rabb al-māl the 
right to determine wrongdoing is hardly likely 
to result in an objective and impartial judgment. 
Notwithstanding these complications, this 
research is interested in the idea of developing 
an instrument to enable the rabb al-māl to get 
compensation if entrepreneur negligence and 
misconduct do occur.
Adiwarman (2011) also emphasizes the element 
of security or collateral in muḍārabah financing 
as practiced by Islamic banks in Indonesia. In 
their implementations, the muḍārabah contract 
is maintained as a trust contract, but the financier 
(bank) is allowed to impose collateral against 
any customer negligence or misconduct.  This 
practice is supported by AAOIFI in Sharīʽah 
Standard No. 13, Section 6, which allows the 
placement of such securities by stating:
 “The capital provider is permitted 
to obtain guarantees from the 
muḍārib that are adequate and 
enforceable on condition that the 
capital provider will not enforce 
these guarantees except in cases 
of misconduct, negligence or 
breach of contract on the part of 
the muḍārib.”
However, Adiwarman (2011) did not mention 
when the collateral will be used to claim 
compensation for clients and customers. Does 
the practice of the banks genuinely compensate 
the capital provider regarding the negligence or 
misconduct of the entrepreneur, or are there cases 
where they liquidate the collateral against losses 
not resulting from negligence and misconduct? 
Furthermore, who will determine that the 
entrepreneurs have committed negligence and 
misconduct in their actions? Can the bank alone 
decide on the matter? If the bank is the only 
party that can determine whether entrepreneurs 
have committed negligence or misconduct, is it 
fair to customers to have their fates determined 
by the financiers? Who then will examine the 
moral hazard of the financier (rabb al-māl) 
determining customers’ negligence?
The Problem of Capital and Muqtaḍā al-ʽAqd.
Aznan and Zaharuddin (2011), like Ashraf and 
Hakim (2011), have chosen the majority view 
of scholars that does not allow the element 
of guarantee in trust-based contracts such as 
muḍārabah and mushārakah, except if there is 
an element of taʽaddī and taqṣīr. However, the 
authors raised several other issues that could be 
classified as controversial.
Aznan and Zaharuddin (2011) cited the views of 
some contemporary scholars about the types of 
taʽaddī; for example, Hussein Hamid and Abdul 
Hamid al-Ba’li proposed that if that muḍārib 
has done feasibility studies and the investment 
results differ from the projections contained 
therein, the muḍārib should be considered to 
have committed negligence and misconduct 
in his operations. In addition, the case can be 
analogized with the case of al-taghrīr bi al-fiʽl 
(deceiving by deeds). Here, as in Ashraf and 
Hakim’s view, it is the responsibility of the 
muḍārib to prove that the failure to achieve 
profitability as in the feasibility studies is not 
due to his negligence.
The view of Hussein Hamid and al-Ba’li places 
too much weight on the feasibility study as a 
criterion for honesty, equating honesty with 
profit and dishonesty with loss. Interviews with 
the entrepreneurs showed that the feasibility 
study is not a primary factor of success or a very 
reliable predictor of it. On the other hand, the 
view of Ashraf and Lokmanul Hakim (2011) 
may be more suitable to protect the capital 
owner.
Aznan and Zaharuddin (2011) also appeared 
to agree with Hussein Hamid in allowing 
liability for taʽaddī to cover submission of all 
the muḍārabah assets to the rabb al-māl even if 
the muḍārabah assets exceed the capital costs. 
This view is intended to prevent the muḍārib 
from committing taʽaddī in situations in which 
the value of the assets rise during the course of 
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the muḍārabah venture, which may motivate 
him to liquidate the muḍārabah assets, return 
the capital back to the rabb al-māl, and pocket 
the difference. 
However, this view does not recognize the 
increased value of company properties as a profit 
that reflects the muḍārib’s good management 
through smart purchasing strategies. Therefore, 
it is more preferable if both parties should 
share accordingly any amount above the capital 
amount. Furthermore, this view may not be 
feasible in mushārakah in which the IFI provides 
part of the working capital that is used to bear the 
operating costs. In this kind of mushārakah, the 
determination of profit is settled after calculating 
the overall profit of the company’s operations. 
In the event of taʽddī, the mushārik seems to be 
a guarantor and liable to repay the investment 
by surrendering all of the company’s assets. It 
seems unfair to the mushārik when mushārakah 
puts profit-sharing as a major requirement.
Aznan and Zaharuddin (2011) stressed that 
some past scholars such as al-Shawkānī and Ibn 
Taymiyyah and recent scholars such as Nazih 
Ḥammād allow the stipulation of ḍamān upon 
the muḍārib or mushārik. This study humbly 
offers a contrasting view from that of Aznan 
and Zaharuddin (2011) in their interpretation of 
Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, which they understand 
to support the permissibility of holding the 
muḍārib or the mushārik liable. The differing 
interpretations of Ibn Taymiyyah’s statements 
will be discussed in detail in section 3.4.1 on the 
essential nature of muḍārabah.
Although Ḥammād (2011) also upheld the 
non-guarantee element in muḍārabah, he 
inclined towards shifting the burden of proof in 
disputes over profit shortfalls to the entrepreneur 
(muḍārib), i.e., he would have to prove that he 
had not been negligent and  had not engaged in 
misconduct (Aznan & Zaharuddin, 2011).
A few writers before Ḥammād explored 
muḍārabah and mushārakah contracts. For 
instance, Uthmani (2005: 38-40) discussed 
in detail current Islamic finance practices, 
including muḍārabah and mushārakah. He 
called attention to the element of capital 
guarantee in mushārakah mutanāqiṣah as 
presenting a possible issue of Sharīʽah non-
compliance in the arrangement. ʽAbd al-Muṭalib 
(2005) and Al-Khuwaytir, (1999) also explored 
muḍārabah and mushārakah contracts and 
related them to the practices of Islamic financial 
institutions. However, they did touch upon a 
few relevant issues related to this study, such 
as the nature of the muḍārabah contract, the 
capital contribution, negligence and misconduct, 
among others. On the other hand, al-Dabb 
(1998) explored muḍārabah within the scope of 
Islamic economics. He compared the view of the 
Sharīʽah on muḍārabah with the existing law of 
his country, Jordan. 
A number of studies have explored the issues 
of ḍamān, taqṣīr and taʽaddī in some detail. 
Ahmad (2009) touched upon the issues of 
tafrīṭ, ifrāṭ and taʽaddī and the consequence 
of those acts, including ḍamān such as Al-
ʽAnzī (2009) wrote clearly and systematically 
about compensation conditions in contracts. 
He discussed taqṣīr and taʽaddī as well as the 
ways to compensate for those acts. Similarly Al-
Khafīf (1981) wrote a valuable book on ḍamān 
in Islamic jurisprudence. He differentiated 
between contracts whose nature is guarantee 
and situations where a partner is liable (ḍāmin) 
because of his acts without transforming the 
contract into a guarantee-based contract.
To conclude the literature review, based on the 
discussion above, there are certain issues that do 
not require further debate, such as jurists’ views 
on muḍārabah and mushārakah; and debate on 
the evidence for the legality of muḍārabah and 
mushārakah. 
However, a brief discussion of these topics is still 
relevant for maintaining an orderly presentation 
of the concept under discussion. After analyzing 
the works cited, it is very clear that a few topics 
require further discussion; for example:
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1. issues related to muqtaḍā al-ʽaqd in 
muḍārabah and mushārakah;
2. types of actions that can be considered 
from an Islamic point of view as taqṣīr 
or taʽaddī;
3. elements of security and guarantee 
in muḍārabah and mushārakah that 
are permissible as long as they do not 
change the essence of muḍārabah and 
mushārakah;
4. the contention that placing the burden 
of proof on the muḍārib or mushārik 
does not transform the muḍārabah or 





This research applies qualitative research 
approaches using content analysis, which is via 
fiqh muqāran (comparative analysis of jurists’ 
arguments) and other related sources. In the first 
phase, the study collected data from libraries 
in the form of appropriate books, journals and 
other publications and from recognized internet 
websites that discuss some of the issues related 
to the research objectives: inter alia, Islamic 
principles and concepts related to Islamic law, 
and standards and guidelines on finance and the 
banking industry. The researchers also engaged 
in various industry talks in order to further 
understand the subjects of the study. 
In the second phase, the fiqh muqāran and the 
related sources that been chosen. Thus, effort 
was then made to determine which of their views 
is the most preferable. All the data generated 
was critically analyzed to answer the objectives 
progressively.  
The Essential Nature Of Partnership 
Contracts
The subject of muqtaḍā al-ʽaqd (the essential 
nature of the contract) remains relevant as 
scholars disputed in determining the permanent 
elements of a contract. One scholar may say 
that the non-guarantee basis is an untouchable 
element in the partnership contract while others 
may reject such a sweeping generalisation. 
Therefore, a reasonably thorough discussion 
is needed in order to explore the essence of 
muḍārabah and mushārakah and discover the 
elements of muqtaḍā al-ʽaqd for both contracts.
This section focuses the discussion on definitions 
of muḍārabah and mushārakah, comparing 
and contrasting them, identifying the roles of 
the entrepreneur in muḍārabah and the partner 
(sharīk or mushārik) in mushārakah, the types 
of muḍārabah and mushārakah, the features 
of muḍārabah and mushārakah which relate 
to the essence of the contracts, the contracting 
parties, the capital, the loss-sharing element, 
management of the fund and enhancement of the 
contracts. 
Definitions of Muḍārabah and Mushārakah
Muḍārabah is derived from the Arabic word 
“ḍarb” which, when used in the phrase “ḍarb fī 
al-ar”, means to travel on the earth for trade or 
business (Ibn Manẓūr, n.d.: 545).  The Qur’ān 
mentions the root word with this meaning in 
Sūrah al-Muzammil, verse 20 which means:  “…
and others traveling throughout the land seeking 
of the bounty of Allah...”As a technical term, 
Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī scholars have defined the 
muḍārabah contract as a contract for partnership 
in profit using the capital of one party and the 
efforts of the other [al-Marghīnānī, n.d.: 4/200; 
Ibn Qudāmah, n.d.: 5/134; Al-Baghdādī, 1999: 
303]. Mālikī and Shāfiʽī scholars defined 
muḍārabah as an authorization to conduct 
trade using cash turned over to the entrepreneur 
against a portion of the profit when it becomes 
known (Khalīl, n.d.: 6/203, Al-Bujayrimī, 1996: 
3/537).
The Mālikīs and Shāfiʽīs preferred to use the 
term tawkīl (authorization or appointment of an 
agent) in their definition whereas the Ḥanafīs 
and Ḥanbalīs inclined towards using the term 
ishtirāk (partnership). It is understood that the 
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Mālikīs and Shāfiʽīs looked at this contract as a 
variant or manifestation of the wakālah (agency) 
contract and saw the elements of the agency 
contract to be more relevant than the partnership 
elements. On the other hand, the Ḥanafī and 
Ḥanbalī Schools have used the term ishtirāk 
(participation), which suits their practice of 
discussing this contract under the rubric of the 
mushārakah contract, and they classified it as 
sharikat al-ʽinān (Ibn Qudāmah, n.d.: 5/136, al-
Kāsānī, 2000: 5/112). Ibn Qudāmah (n.d.: 5/136) 
says that (Muḍārabah) follows the rule of shirkat 
al-ʽinān in that anything permissible for the 
partner to do is permissible for the entrepreneur 
to do, and anything prohibited for the partner is 
prohibited for the entrepreneur.
However, although they did not refer to agency 
in the definition, the Ḥanafī School agreed that 
the meaning of wakālah still remains as the 
essence of contract in muḍārabah, al Kasani 
(2000: 5/112) states that [the condition of 
validity] related to the contracting parties- i.e., 
the capital owner and the entrepreneur - is the 
legal capacity to appoint an agent or to act as an 
agent because the entrepreneur acts according to 
the instructions of the capital owner, which is the 
meaning of agency.One contemporary writer, 
Ismail (2010), summarized the components of 
muḍārabah and classified this kind of contract 
as a partnership in profit, joint venture in which 
one party provides capital and the other party 
provides managerial skill and labour. Hence, 
according to al-Zaylaʽī [1313H: 5/52] in Tabyīn 
al-Ḥaqā’iq, muḍārabah is profit sharing in 
which both parties share the profit, though the 
capital is taken from the capital owner alone 
and the work is done by the entrepreneur alone. 
The provider of the capital is called rabb al-māl 
or  āḥib al-māl, while the provider of skill and 
labour is called the muḍārib. (Ismail, A. G., 
2010). 
Any profit from the business will be shared 
according to a pre-agreed profit-sharing ratio. If 
there is a loss, the capital provider will absorb 
the loss while the entrepreneur will lose all the 
effort and time put into the business. But if it 
was proven that the entrepreneur was negligent 
in conducting the business, he will have to bear 
the loss. Another terminological difference is 
that the Ḥanafī and the Ḥanbalī Schools call 
this partnership muḍārabah while the Shāfiʽī 
and the Mālikī Schools call it muqāraḍah, 
which is derived from the Arabic word qarʽ 
meaning ‘loan’. The technical meaning of qarḍ 
is surrender of right over capital by the owner 
to the user, as a charitable act and not to obtain 
profit but with the stipulation that the original 
amount be returned to its owner. A linguistic 
variant of muqāraḍah is qirāḍ (al-Bayjurī, 
1999:2/37,38).
According to Abu Saud (1976), both words, 
muḍārabah and qirāḍ, are used to signify the 
same idea, which is to give somebody out of 
your capital a part to trade in, provided that the 
profit is shared between both of you or that an 
apportioned shared of profit is allocated to him 
accordingly. The active partner is called a ḍārib 
[sic] because he is the one who travels and trades. 
It is also possible for both the capital provider 
and the active partner to be called muḍārib or 
muqāriḍ as both share the profits with each other.
On the other hand, Al-Bayjurī (1999: 1/734), 
Shāfiʽī scholar, defines mushārakah or shirkah 
as an establishment of a right by way of joint 
ownership between two or more parties. The 
Ḥanbalī scholar, Ibn Qudāmah [n.d.: 5/109] says 
that it is sharing in entitlement or in disposal.” 
Both of these definitions avoid restricting 
them to contractual acts as the partnership in 
mushārakah is not necessarily derived from a 
contract; it may result from other causes such as 
inheritance, a gift, charity, etc. 
Ḥanafī scholars such as al-Marghīnānī and al-
Kāsānī preferred not to define shirkah as they 
directly divided shirkah into two types: shirkat 
al-milk and shirkat al-ʽaqd (al-Marghīnānī, n.d.: 
3/5; al-Kāsānī, 2000: 5/73). A similar approach 
can be seen in Mālikī books such as Bidāyat 
al-Mujtahid (Ibn Rushd/, 1995: 2/203). There 
is a consensus of opinion among the jurists of 
all schools (including Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs, Shāfiʽīs 
and Ḥanbalīs) that mushārakah is a valid and 
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legitimate contract in Islam; however, they 
dispute regarding the types of permissible 
mushārakah contracts. This will be discussed in 
a coming subtopic (Usmani, 2005: 82; Usmani, 
2003: 249-255). 
Types of Muḍārabah and Mushārakah 
Contracts
The muḍārabah contract can be categorized 
into two types: restricted (muqayyadah) and 
unrestricted (muṭlaqah) (al-Marghīnānī, n.d.: 
4/201). According to Ismail [2010], restricted 
muḍārabah is defined as a contract in which 
the rabb al-māl restricts the actions of the 
muḍārib to a specified period and/or location or 
to a particular type of business that the rabb al-
māl considers appropriate, but not in a manner 
that would unduly constrain the muḍārib in 
his operations. Unrestricted muḍārabah may 
be defined as a type in which the rabb al-māl 
permits the muḍārib to manage the muḍārabah 
fund without any restriction.If the finance 
provider stipulates restrictions in the contract 
and the muḍārib agrees to them, then he is bound 
by the terms he has agreed to Ayub [2007]. In 
unrestricted muḍārabah, the rabb al-māl has left 
it up to the muḍārib to undertake any business 
he wishes; hence, the muḍārib is authorized 
to invest the funds as he deems fit. However, 
the contracting parties may mutually agree to 
change the type of muḍārabah that they entered 
into to another type of muḍārabah at any point 
of time.
Jurists have used a different set of considerations 
in their categorisation of the mushārakah 
contract. According to the Ḥanafīs and the 
Ḥanbalīs, the two main types are shirkat al-ʽaqd 
(pl. al-ʽuqūd) and shirkat al-milk (pl. al-amlāk) 
(al-Kāsānī, 2000: 4/73; Ibn Qudāmah, n.d.: 
5/109; Asmadi, 2011). This categorization is of 
paramount importance because the consequences 
and rulings of the two categories differ from one 
another. Shirkat al-milk is joint ownership on 
a non-contractual basis while shirkat alʽuqūd 
is contractual partnership.They further divide 
shirkat al-milk into two types (al-Kāsānī, 2000: 
4/74-75):
1. Shirkat al-milk al-ikhtiyārī (discretionary 
joint ownership). It is co-ownership of 
an asset resulting from the decision of 
two or more parties to jointly purchase 
it. It could also result from a gift to 
the partners during the lifetime of the 
donor or by a bequest, which transfers 
its ownership after the donor’s death, or 
from a charitable donation. If they accept 
the gift or the bequest or the donation, 
they become partners in the asset without 
any contractual partnership.
2. Non-discretionary shirkat al-milk is 
joint ownership that occurs without the 
partners’ willingness playing any role. 
It is a result of automatic inheritance 
(mīrāth), whereby the entitlement is 
prescribed by the Sharīʽah. 
The Mālikīs categorized shirkah into three 
categories, those are shirkat al-irth (partnership 
because of inheritance), shirkat al-ghanīmah 
(partnership amongst the soldiers of an army 
regarding property captured from the enemy) 
and Shirkat al-mubtāʽʽīn (partnership among 
purchasers). Shirkah al-mubtāʽīn as elaborated 
by the Mālikīs is similar to shirkat al-milk as 
discussed by the Ḥanafīs and the Ḥanbalīs, 
although the Mālikīs separated the partnership 
due to inheritance from the partnership due to 
purchase (al-Kāsānī, 2000: 4/73; Ibn Rushd, 
1995: 2/203,206; Ibn Qudāmah, n.d.: 5/109; al-
Jazīrī, 2001: 654-661). In contrast, the tendency 
of most Shāfiʽī scholars in their treatment 
of partnership is to limit their discussion to 
the permissibility of shirkat al-ʽinān without 
any reference to shirkat al-milk [al-Kāsānī, 
2000: 4/73; Ibn Rushd, 1995: 2/203,206; Ibn 
Qudāmah, n.d.: 5/109, Al-Jazīrī, 2001: 654-661; 
Asmadi, 2011]. 
Shirkat alʽuqūd (contractual partnership) 
,Shirkat al-ʽuqūd can be considered a proper 
partnership because the concerned parties have 
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willingly entered into a contractual agreement 
for joint investment and the sharing of profits 
and risks. The Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī scholars 
subdivided this kind of shirkah into four 
different types (al-Kāsānī, 2000: 4/73; Ibn Rushd 
al-Ḥafīd, n.d.: 2/203,206; Ibn Qudāmah, n.d.: 
5/109). In case of Al-ʽnān, it is a contract where 
two or more parties agree to share their capital 
and efforts in a business. The shares in the profit 
and loss from the business must be determined 
at the beginning of the contract. Al-ʽnān implies 
that the partners need not all be adults, nor must 
they have an equal share in the capital. Likewise, 
they are not necessarily equally responsible for 
the management of the business. Accordingly, 
their share in the profits may be unequal, but 
this must be clearly specified in the partnership 
contract. On the other hand, their share in the 
losses would be proportional to each partner’s 
capital contribution.
Discussion of shirkat al-milk and the common 
requirements of mushārakah
In examining shirkat al-milk, the Ḥanafīs 
discussed a number of issues such as the use of 
the asset by one party in the absence of the other 
owners; the sale of one partner’s ownership 
share to other partners or to a third party; and 
the status of the asset and the permissibility of 
selling it if it is on another party’s land; e.g., a 
building on leased land (al-Jazīrī, 2001: 654-
655). 
The Mālikīs enumerated a number of issues, 
inter alia, ways to resolve the problem when 
the sleeping partner of jointly owned property 
declines the active partner’s request to use 
the asset; how the active partner deals with 
certain circumstances; the right of each partner 
to protect his or her asset; and how they can 
ensure that their asset is protected physically 
or constructively during its use [al-Jazīrī, 2001: 
657-658].The Ḥanafīs deliberated two main 
conditions for common shirkah (including 
shirkat al-milk) [al-Jazīrī, 2001: 662], those are 
the subject matter of shirkah must be amenable 
to disposal under an agency (wakālah) contract; 
and the profit must be pre-determined by ratio 
or percentage. Shirkah is void if there was no 
pre-determined ratio or if the profit of one of 
the partners is pre-determined as a fixed amount 
such as one thousand dollars. 
Actually, the second condition was meant for 
contractual partnership (shirkat al-ʽaqd) rather 
than shirkat al-milk. Profit in shirkat al-milk 
should be equal to the partners’ portions in the 
partnership. No further discussion on shirkat 
al-milk was found in the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī 
literature. By understanding these requirements, 
this study will be able to analyse the practices 
of mushārakah in the existing Islamic finance 
industry.
The Essence of the Muḍārabah and 
Mushārakah Contracts
There are a number of features in the muḍārabah 
contract that comprise the muqtaḍā al-ʽaqd 
(the nature and implications of the contract). 
Muqtaḍā is derived from iqtaḍā/yaqtaḍī. It 
literally means ‘contents’ or ‘reasons’, as quoted 
by Jarjīs (1996: 124): “He wanted it; or the cause 
required it.” Muqtaḍā (nature and implications) 
is defined as theories and general rules which 
are the foundations of the contract (See: Maany 
website, 2013).
The Essential Nature of Muḍārabah 
There are a number of features which comprise 
the muqtaḍā al-ʽaqd of the muḍārabah contract. 
Al-Kāsānī (2000: 5/82) mentioned the relation 
between the profit (ribḥ) and the elements that 
justify entitlement to it. He stresses that the rabb 
al-māl is entitled to profit because of the risk 
facing his capital, and profit is the way to grow 
the capital. Likewise, the muḍārib (entrepreneur) 
in muḍārabah or the partner in mushārakah is 
the one who works for the business; thus the 
profit is compensation of his work. On the other 
hand, whenever the muḍārib becomes liable 
for the muḍārabah, then the whole profit must 
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become his right. Hence, the element of facing 
risk is crucial to the rabb al-māl’s entitlement 
to profit in muḍārabah and mushārakah. 
Therefore, the risk that accompanies investment 
is a paramount element and an essential aspect 
of both contracts. Ibn Taymiyyah (2001, 29/75) 
makes a fine distinction regarding muqtaḍā al-
ʽaqd as follows:
If someone says, “This stipulated 
condition conflicts with the 
muqtaḍā alʽaqd,” one may say 
to him, “Does it conflict with the 
nature of the unrestricted contract 
or (does it) absolutely (conflict) 
with the nature of the contract? 
If he meant the first, then all 
conditions do that. If he meant the 
second, his claim is not conceded. 
The prohibition in stipulation is 
when it contradicts the purpose of 
the contract.
He further explained (2001, 29/85):
The contract has two states: 
unrestricted and restricted. A 
distinction has been made [in the 
Sharīʽah] between the unrestricted 
contract and the unrestricted 
meaning (al-maʽnā al-muṭlaq, 
i.e., purpose) of contracts. If 
someone says, “This stipulation 
contradicts the nature of the 
contract (muqtaḍā al-ʽaqd),” 
he may mean that it contradicts 
the unrestricted contract, but 
the same goes for every added 
condition, and there is no harm 
in that. If the intended meaning is 
that the stipulation contradicts the 
nature of [both] the unrestricted 
and restricted contract, evidence 
needs to be presented for that. 
This (statement) is only true if 
the stipulation contradicts the 
purpose of the contract.
From the above statements, it can be understood 
that Ibn Taymiyyah rejected the categorization 
of all conditions as conflicting with the essence 
of muḍārabah. He excludes conditions that do 
not contradict the purpose of the contract, which 
is considered as the genuine essence of the 
contract. He clearly affirms two points; first, if 
the terms contradict the purpose of the contract, 
the terms are considered invalid and can nullify 
the contract. Second, ff the terms contradict 
the Qur’ān and Sunnah, then such terms are 
considered null and void. Almost all scholars 
agreed that the element of bearing investment 
risk is paramount in the muḍārabah contract and 
can be considered as the main characteristic that 
distinguishes it from a loan contract and a ribā-
based contract. 
The Contradicting Views on a Capital 
Guarantee
As discussed in the literature review, a few 
scholars argued that a capital guarantee is 
permissible in muḍārabah. They supported their 
view by mentioning certain statements of Ibn 
Taymiyyah (2001: 30/62).
“As for stipulating the return 
of the capital or its value, it is 
comparable to asking for the 
return of the tree and the land. 
As for stipulating the return of 
an equivalence of the seed, the 
discussion is involved and I have 
mentioned it elsewhere.”
“If the owner of the seeds 
stipulates getting (back the volume 
of) the seeds (he contributed) 
and that they divide the rest, it is 
permissible, as in muḍārabah.”
They understood Ibn Taymiyyah’s view as 
being the same as their own in the course of 
arguing that it is permissible to impose ḍamān 
on the muḍārib or the mushārik (i.e., to make 
them liable for any loss). We do not understand 
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Ibn Taymiyyah’s statements to support capital 
guarantee; rather, he is dealing with the methods 
of distributing profit after it has been realized. 
Furthermore, as discussed before, it should be 
understood that the statement above was part 
of his explanation of musāqāh and is not about 
muḍārabah per se, although the elements of 
risk sharing and partnership are also present in 
musāqāh. Moreover, this statement was part 
of his reasoning for rejecting the stipulation of 
a capital owner reserving for himself the fruits 
of certain trees or the profit from selling certain 
goods. On the other hand, it is permissible for 
the partner in musāqāh, in the event of positive 
income, to stipulate that he should get the value 
of his capital in its original form. 
Obviously, the second quoted statement indicates 
that in certain ways the rules of musāqāh are 
similar to muḍārabah. Likewise, it is allowed 
to stipulate the regaining of the seeds owner’s 
original volume as it is included in the retrieval 
of the original capital, which is permissible in 
muḍārabah and musāqāh if the outcomes of the 
activities were positive. On the other hand, it is 
prohibited to earmark the outcomes of certain 
activities in the muḍārabah or musāqāh pool of 
activities for one party and of other activities to 
the other party. This matter has been discussed 
by AAOIFI in its Sharīʽah Standards (AAOIFI, 
2010: No. 13, Section 8).
Ibn Taymiyyah prohibited capital guarantees 
in muḍārabah can be seen in many of his 
statements; for example (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2001: 
30/61):
“It is because partnership 
(including musāqāt, muzāraʽāt 
and muḍārabah) requires justice 
for both parties; therefore they 
share the yields and the risks after 
both of them have obtained their 
capital.”
The capital guarantee is a kind of unfairness 
in investment. To uphold justice one should 
be ready to bear the investment risk in order to 
be entitled to a profit. Ibn Taymiyyah was very 
strict in prohibiting gifts in muḍārabah (Ibn 
Taymiyyah, 2001: 30/62):
“Some people have disputed with 
us on this (point). They are of the 
view that the donor is making a 
voluntary contribution, which is 
not so. Rather, it is a gift motivated 
by the loan transaction between 
them” (though the original 
contract in this arrangement is 
muḍārabah) 
Therefore, the study found that Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
view is in line with that of the majority of 
scholars in prohibiting a capital guarantee. It 
is not appropriate to interpret his statements 
out of context and definitely not appropriate to 
attribute the stance of those who allowed capital 
guarantee to him by using his statements, for 
those statements show something else.
The Essential Nature of Mushārakah
The discussion of the essence of the mushārakah 
contract is directly related to the categorization 
of mushārakah into shirkat al-milk and shirkat 
al-ʽaqd. Therefore, Muṣṭafā al-Zarqā and Taqi 
Uthmani elaborated these categories and their 
relation to the issue of the guarantee element 
in mushārakah (Asmadi, 2011).Muṣṭafā al-
Zarqā (2004: 1/354) was among the scholars 
who pioneered the discussion of shirkat al-
milk. He elaborated this issue under the rubric 
of “undivided ownership” (al-milkiyyah al-
shā’iʽah). There are two main factors that exclude 
any form of partnership from shirkat al-ʽaqd; 
firstly, the partnership is solely in ownership of 
a tangible asset; secondly, there is no agreement 
to jointly invest it (Taqi Uthmani 2005: 82). 
Moreover, the partnership can be considered 
as shirkat al-milk if no promise has been made 
that either party will invest the asset by way of 
leasing or another method of generating income 
from it (Al-Zarqā, 2004: 1/616). In the event 
that both parties agree to invest the asset, or for 
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one of them to lease it to the other, or to a third 
party, the joint ownership partnership has been 
transformed into a contractual partnership.
Al-Zarqā clearly states that the arrangement 
must be free from prearrangement to lease or 
invest the subject matter in order to consider 
it a non-contractual partnership. Therefore, 
when there was a prearrangement to lease, 
the partnership has been transformed into a 
contractual partnership in which any promise 
to guarantee the capital or profit is ḥarām as it 
contradicts the essential nature of shirkat al-
ʽaqd. 
One may argue against the approach of this 
study to refer mainly to al-Zarqā, Taqi Uthmani 
and a few schools of thought in this discussion. 
However, those who are familiar with the issue 
of mushārakah in Islamic law discourse are able 
to understand this approach as the division of 
mushārakah into co-ownership and contractual 
ownership was initiated by the scholars from the 
Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī madhhabs. Other madhhabs 
focused specifically on the usage of a jointly 
owned undivided asset, as discussed earlier. 
Recent scholars who actively discussed these 
issues are al-Zarqā in his book al-Madkhal al-
Fiqhī al-ʽĀmm and Taqi Uthmani. According 
to them, shifting the essence of contractual 
mushārakah by classifying it as a type of co-
ownership in order to permit a capital guarantee 
is not appropriate as this kind of mushārakah 
does not have the features of shirkat al-milk.
The Management of the Muḍārabah and 
Mushārakah Venture
Regarding the contracting parties in muḍārabah, 
they consist of the rabb al-māl and the muḍārib. 
The rabb al-māl and muḍārib must have legal 
capacity to execute contracts, including the 
agency (wakālah) contract as either a principal 
or an agent. The legal capacity of a natural 
person is defined as the capacity to have rights 
and responsibilities and the capacity to have 
one’s actions take legal effect. The primary 
requirement for the legal capacity of a natural 
person is to be of sound mind (al-Jazīrī, 2001; Ibn 
Hazm, n.d.: 638). Meanwhile, the legal capacity 
of a legal entity is defined as the eligibility to 
acquire rights and assume responsibilities. As 
discussed before, the element of wakālah is 
explicitly mentioned by al-Kāsānī (2000: 6/81):
“The (condition) that relates to 
both contracting parties-i.e., the 
capital owner and entrepreneur-
is that they should have the legal 
capacity to appoint an agent or to 
act as one.”
Furthermore, the contracting parties in 
muḍārabah may involve more than one muḍārib 
or rabb al-māl. This contract is not limited to 
only two parties. But if muḍārabah involves 
more than one rabb al-māl, an agreement 
among the capital providers may be established 
whereby an existing capital provider agrees to 
relinquish his right over a certain portion of 
the profit if he withdraws from the muḍārabah 
prior to its maturity date and also a new capital 
provider agrees to assume liability in respect of 
the muḍārabah that is already in operation prior 
to his participation. An example of multiple 
muḍāribs is that a rabb al-māl offers his money 
to Party A and Party B, such that each one of 
them can act for him as muḍārib, and the capital 
of the muḍārabah shall be utilized by both of 
them jointly, and the share of the muḍārib shall 
be distributed between them according to the 
agreed proportion. Consequently, both mudaribs 
shall run the business as if they were partners.
Other than that, muḍārabah can be individual 
or joint. Islamic banks practice muḍārabah in 
both forms. In case of individual muḍārabah, an 
Islamic bank provides finance to a commercial 
venture run by a person or a company on the 
basis of profit sharing. The joint muḍārabah 
may be between the investors and the bank on 
a continuing basis. Many Islamic investment 
funds operate on the basis of joint muḍārabah.
The muḍārib is an entrepreneur who provides 
management skills. His status in the business 
is that he is a fiduciary (amīn). Hence, the 
muḍārabah capital is an amānah (trust) in the 
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hand of the muḍārib. Therefore, if any loss 
incurs to the business without negligence by the 
muḍārib, the muḍārib shall not be liable for that 
loss (al-Marghīnānī, n.d.: 4/200).
As discussed before, the Ḥanafīs in elaborating 
shirkat al-milk, have highlighted a few issues 
related to the use of the asset by one party in 
the absence of the other owners; the sale of one 
partner’s ownership to the other partners or to 
a third party; and the status of the asset and 
the permissibility of selling it if it is on a third 
party’s land, e.g., a building on leased land (al-
Jazīrī, 2001: 654-658).In addition the Mālikīs 
have discussed the ways to resolve the problem 
when a sleeping partner of jointly owned 
property declines a request by the active partner 
to use the asset, and the right of each partner 
to act to protect his/her asset. Specifically, 
their discussions focused on the limitations 
to the independence of each partner, which 
indicates that in shirkat al-milk each partner acts 
independently within certain limits [al-Jazīrī, 
2001: 654-658]. In contrast, both contracting 
parties in shirkat al-ʽaqd are responsible to 
conduct the business. Therefore, each of them 
should have the capacity to be an agent for the 
other (al-Kāsānī 2000: 5/77).
A similar stance can be seen in the Shāfiʽī and 
Ḥanbalī Schools (al-Bayjurī, 1999: 1/736-737). 
Ibn Qudāmah (n.d.: 5/129) of the Ḥanbalī School 
says that the ʽinān partnership is based upon (the 
principles of) agency and trusteeship. However, 
in discussing the legal capacity of partners for 
shirkat al-mufāwaḍah, the Ḥanafīs add another 
condition: legal capacity to provide a guarantee. 
That is because each party is liable for the other 
party’s acts (al-Kāsānī, n.d.: 5/80).Therefore, 
scholars agreed that the role of the partners in 
mushārakah is to jointly conduct and manage 
the business or asset. Both parties have the status 
of a trustee as either one can act on behalf of the 
business
The Capital
Capital is the principal element of muḍārabah, 
forming the substance of the contract. What 
makes muḍārabah different from mushārakah is 
that the muḍārabah capital is to be contributed 
solely by the capital provider. Scholars are of 
consensus that capital in a monetary form is 
valid; however, they disputed the acceptability 
of a non-monetary asset as capital. The 
argument against it is that a dispute may arise 
in determining the value of the asset. Al-
Shīrāzī (n.d.: 2/227) stated that the majority of 
jurists hold the view that the capital must be in 
monetary form.The same view can be found 
in the literature of the Mālikīs, Ḥanafīs and 
Ḥanbalīs. They held that the prohibition is due 
to the element of uncertainty (gharar). A few 
scholars, such as Ibn Abī Laylā1 and Aḥmad, in 
the view less favored by his followers, permit 
muḍārabah capital to be in the form of assets 
(Ibn Rushd, 1995: 2/191; Ibn Qudāmah, n.d.: 
5/124; al-Kāsānī, 2000: 5/112; al-Shīrāzī, n.d.: 
2/227).
In contrast, the capital in a mushārakah venture 
must come from both contracting parties, either 
by way of a contractual partnership agreement 
or co-ownership by way of inheritance, joint 
purchase of an asset, etc. It is also permissible to 
structure this kind of ownership so that one party 
gradually purchases the other party’s ownership 
so as to become the sole owner of the venture. 
The determination of the price should observe 
the rule that a capital guarantee is not allowed. 
With regards to the type of capital in mushārakah, 
according to the Mālikī School and some Ḥanbalī 
scholars, assets shall be valued according to the 
market price. Therefore, monetary assets of 
different currencies shall be valued according 
to an agreed currency at the time of signing the 
mushārakah contract, and physical assets shall 
be valued according to a recognised valuation 
method and with the agreement of all parties 
(Ibn Rushd, 1995: 2/204; Ibn Qudāmah, n.d.: 
5/125). On the other hand, Imām Abū Ḥanīfah 
1  Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Laylā 
was recognized as a major scholar during his 
lifetime and was appointed as the Mufti of Kufah. 
He died in 148 AH
 (see: www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/showalam.
php?ids=12526 accessed on 4 Disember 2013).
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and the majority of Ḥanbalīs are of the view that 
the capital must be in cash so as to avoid two 
things; first, the inability to mix the ownership 
of the items as each tangible asset would belong 
to one of them; hence, partnership would not 
occur; second, the inability to divide undividable 
items when the share capital is redistributed to 
each partner during the winding up process (al-
Kāsānī, 2000: 5/112; Ibn Qudāmah, n.d.: 5/124).
Meanwhile, the Shāfiʽīs are of the view that it 
is permissible to use fungible items (dhawāt 
al-amthāl); i.e., items of similar quality such 
as grades of wheat, rice, etc. that are treated 
as interchangeable in the market; however, it 
is not permissible to use non-fungible items 
(dhawāt al-qīmah); i.e. items too dissimilar to be 
treated as interchangeable in the market, such as 
animals. Compensation for destruction of items 
of the latter category is not by replacement but 
by paying the price (al-Shīrāzī, n.d.: 2/156; al-
Bayjurī, 1999: 2/38; al-Jazīrī, n.d.).According 
to Usmani (2005), this categorization enabled 
Imām al-Shāfiʽī to answer the redistribution issue 
at the time of winding up the venture; however, 
it still could not answer the issue of mixing 
the ownership of the items with other partners 
after the partnership execution. Therefore, the 
most appropriate view to deal with this issue 
is to allow the usage of non-cash as capital in 
muḍārabah and mushārakah subject to the 
ability to have it valued at market price and to 
grant the ownership of the assets to the venture.
The capital provider and manager may agree to a 
gradual withdrawal of the muḍārabah capital by 
the capital provider. Failure to provide capital by 
the capital provider as per the agreed schedule 
shall constitute a breach of promise according 
to the specified terms and conditions of the 
contract. The manager has an option to terminate 
the agreement, or both parties may agree to 
revise the agreement based on actual capital 
contribution. If the agreement is terminated, the 
manager has to return the outstanding capital. If 
the muḍārabah expenditure exceeds the actual 
capital contribution, the liability shall be borne 
by the capital provider up to the limit of the total 
amount committed under the contract (Usmani, 
2005).
Profit Sharing in Muḍārabah and Mushārakah, 
and Loss Treatment in Mushārakah
All juristic schools agreed that the objective 
of both muḍārabah and mushārakah is to gain 
and share the profit (ribʽ) (al-Kāsānī, 2000: 
5/82-87; Ibn Qudāmah, n.d.: 5/140). The 
distribution of profit must be pre-determined by 
the contracting parties. Furthermore, the amount 
of profit ascribed to either of the parties must 
be independent of the capital amount; it should 
be dependent solely on the pre-agreed ratio and 
the actual profit realized by the commercial 
enterprise. Al-Kāsānī (2000: 5/82-83) reports 
a representative wording for a muḍārabah 
contract:
“‘Take this capital as muḍārabah 
whereby anything given by Allah 
from the business in the form of 
profit shall be shared between 
us thus;’ either one half, or a 
quarter, or a third, or any other 
pre-determined ratio.”
Al-Kāsānī (2000: 5/119) further states that if 
both of them stipulated that one of them shall 
have half, or one-third, plus 100 dirhams; 
or they said: ‘except 100 dirhams,’ [both 
cases are] impermissible. As such, the only 
determination of profit distribution that is 
permissible is based on the actual profit earned 
by the enterprise. The Sharʽah does not restrict 
or specify proportions to be distributed between 
the parties, leaving it to the best judgment of 
the two independent parties. This ruling follows 
from the view that equality is the default rule of 
division in muḍārabah. The profit-sharing ratio 
shall be determined at the time of the conclusion 
of contract and may be revised from time to time 
during the contract subject to mutual agreement 
(al-Kāsānī, 2000: 5/82, 83,84, 87; al-Shīrāzī, 
n.d.: 2/227; Ibn Qudāmah, n.d.: 5/140,141). 
15
Malaysian Management Journal Vol. 22, December 2018 1-18
With regards to mushārakah, scholars disputed 
on the treatment of profit. The Mālikīs and 
Shāfiʽīs are of the view that the profit should 
follow the ratio of capital (Ibn Rushd, 1995: 
2/204,205; al-Shīrāzī, n.d.: 2/158). However, 
the Ḥanafīs and Ḥanbalīs are of the view that the 
ratio need not be in accordance to the capital, 
taking into consideration variations of labour 
contributed by each partner; the partner who 
played the primary role in the business is allowed 
to obtain a larger portion of the profit provided 
that it has been pre-agreed during the contract 
execution [al-Kāsānī, 2000: 5/82, 83, 84, 87; Ibn 
Qudāmah, n.d.: 5/140]. In reality, their disputes 
arose due to the angle from which they viewed 
mushārakah. The first group of scholars looked 
at mushārakah as a kind of usufruct of an asset 
belonging to both partners whereby both of them 
are entitled to the profit in accord with their 
proportion of the ownership. The second group 
analysed mushārakah as a kind of muḍārabah 
whereby the labour contributes to the gain of 
profit (Ibn Rushd, 1995: 2/204-205). 
However, it should be observed that the profit 
assigned to a party cannot be a percentage of 
the capital amount contributed as that would be 
considered a fixed return tantamount to interest. 
Likewise, the profit assigned to either party 
cannot be a lump sum amount as this would also 
constitute interest (al-Kāsānī, 2000: 5/83).
Loss
Typically in muḍārabah, the rabb al-māl 
shall bear the loss from the investment while 
the muḍārib just loses his efforts [al-Kāsānī, 
2000; Ibn Qudāmah, n.d]. On the other hand, 
all scholars are of the view that all partners in 
mushārakah should bear the loss in proportion 
to their capital contribution [al-Kāsānī, 2000; 
Ibn Qudāmah, n.d]. A third party may undertake 
to bear the loss of capital due to misconduct or 
negligence on the part of the manager for both 
contracts. The rabb al-māl (capital provider) 
may take collateral from the muḍārib, provided 
that the collateral can only be liquidated in 
the event of negligence or misconduct or 
violation of contractual terms by the muḍārib. 
AAOIFI has approved this ruling, as mentioned 
previously. However, the issue of who should 
determine whether negligence and misconduct 
has occurred may cause a dispute between the 
parties. 
Conclusion
The discussion of muḍārabah and mushārakah 
was meant to analyse the most accurate view 
on the essence of both contracts and its relation 
to daman. Therefore, the study found that the 
majority of scholars (including Ibn Taymiyyah) 
were of the view that prohibited a capital 
guarantee as sharing risk in an integral element 
in partnership contracts. It is not appropriate 
to interpret Ibn Taymiyah’s statements out 
of context and definitely not appropriate to 
attribute the stance of those who allowed capital 
guarantee to him by using his statements, for 
those statements show something else.
However, a third party may undertake to bear the 
loss of capital due to misconduct or negligence 
on the part of the manager for both contracts. 
The rabb al-māl (capital provider) may also 
take collateral from the muḍārib, provided that 
the collateral can only be liquidated in the event 
of negligence or misconduct or violation of 
contractual terms by the muḍārib. 
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